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Introduction
A hotel firm entering a new market or expanding its business must always choose among
owning, operating, or franchising a new unit. A firm that franchises (i.e., a franchisor) grants the
use of a brand name to owners (franchisees) of hotel properties that the firm neither owns nor
manages. Franchisees operate the hotels and pay royalty fees that are typically equal to a
percentage of gross sales. A firm engaged in business management provides professional and
comprehensive operations support to lodging properties owned by a third party in exchange for
management fees that are equal to a percentage of gross sales and possibly incentive fees.
Management contracts and franchising agreements have become very popular as means of
enabling firms to achieve rapid growth, increase their probability of survival and gain access to
capital at lower risk, compared to full-ownership (Combs, Ketchen Jr, & Hoover, 2004; Shane,
1998).
In this study, use of “the plural form” refers to the adoption of a multiple-distribution
strategy: franchising, management and full ownership. Since each of these types of business has
both benefits and drawbacks, none can be called the best. Researchers have suggested that the
plural form can help a firm to improve its consistency, efficiency, control, flexibility and
responsiveness to market demands (Brookes & Roper). The plural form gives firms better
opportunities in the market and enables both property owners and operators to grow (Bradach &
Eccles, 1989). Firms with the plural form can overcome financial or managerial resources
constraints or allocate their resources to a better alternative available for investment (Carney &
Gedajlovic, 1991). The plural form also enables firms to optimize profits and reduce risks by
franchising units that are unprofitable or in uncertain markets and owning profitable units
(Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007). Plurally organized firms, that is, firms that conduct business
through simultaneous franchising, management and full-ownership, tend to compensate for
losses incurred by employing one of these types of business with profits made by implementing
another. Accordingly, the plural form is less risky, especially in uncertain and dynamic
environments, and outperforms single business strategies, in terms of overall profitability
(Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007).
Previous studies have examined the distribution of franchised units and company-owned
units, the relationship between franchising and performance (Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short,
2011; Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007; Hsu & Jang, 2009; Shane, 1998) and the superiority of the
plural over the pure form, which is defined as the use of a single business strategy (Ehrmann &
Spranger, 2004; Perrigot, Cliquet, & Piot-Lepetit, 2009). While a large body of research has
focused on franchising, researchers have been silent on the impacts of management contracts on
firms. No previous studies have attempted to determine the percentage of firms employing
business management, although management is very commonly adopted by hotel firms.
Consequently, we still have no conclusive understanding of the benefits of employing different
proportions of franchise, management, and ownership strategies in property portfolios.
Agency theory, risk sharing and portfolio theory conceptually suggest that the plural
form, especially when this includes franchising and/or management, is a way of reducing a
firm’s risk. However, risk has been largely ignored in empirical studies thus far; few studies have
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provided evidence that franchising, management or full-ownership reduce a firm’s risk.
Additionally, the lodging industry has received less attention than other fields, although
franchising and management have contributed significantly to the growth of major hotel chains
since the 1960s. Therefore, this study aims to examine: 1) the superiority of the plural form over
single forms, in terms of both risk and performance in the hotel industry; and 2) the impacts of
different proportions of franchising and management in business portfolios on a firm’s overall
risk and various performance variables, where we expect curvilinear relationships.
Literature Review
Franchising and management are the dominant distribution strategies used by hospitality
firms to grow. Many hotel firms employ multiple business forms simultaneously: managed units
are operated by firms that do not own those units, franchised units are operated by franchisees
with ownership, and owned units are operated by firms with ownership. A portfolio that includes
each of these forms of business is referred as the plural form (Jeffrey L Bradach & Eccles, 1989).
Business ownership is typical during the first stage of business (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Then,
firms tend to expand through franchising and/or management. A management contract is an
agreement between a hotel firm (operator) and a property owner, in which the firm is responsible
for managing the property in a professional manner (Dave, 1984). Franchising is defined as longterm, continuous relationship where owner of a product, process or service (i.e., the franchisor)
licenses someone else (i.e., the franchisee) to use this product, process or service in exchange for
some sort of payment (Khan, 1992).
Diversification is a strategic option that many managers use to improve their firms’
performance and avoid risk. From the portfolio theory perspective (Markowitz, 1952), hotel
firms having more-diversified businesses can reduce business risk more than hotel firms with
less-diversified businesses. Since the plural form is a strategy that allows firms to create value
using multiple business forms, it can be seen as representative of diversification. Having a
diversified portfolio of hotel properties lowers business risk and the probability that a firm will
experience poor performance by smoothing out performance fluctuations (Salter & Weinhold,
1979). Both franchising and management enable firms to conserve capital for other investments,
to grow quickly and to reduce a considerable portion of their cost burdens, including initial fixed
costs and ongoing operating expenses at the unit level (Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001). Although
franchisees are supposed to meet the standards specified in contracts and tend to follow firms’
directions, franchises are often less effective at controlling the quality of products and services
and implementing product innovations in franchised units. Moreover, firms can extract more
profit from company-owned units, in terms of dollar amounts, than franchised or managed units.
Thus, once the terms of a contract expires, franchisor firms often buy back successful franchised
units (Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007).
The benefits and drawbacks of franchising, management and ownership indicate that the
combination of these three forms give firms better opportunities to achieve competitive
advantages than any one of these forms alone. Plurally-organized forms compensate for the
losses made under one form with profits from another form, resulting in lower risk and more
profits. Combining franchising, management and ownership strategies (i.e., employing the plural
business model) may enable firms to reduce agency problems, use their resources more
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effectively by allocating them to more profitable units, balance the efficiency and the quality of
products, reduce risks associated with uncertainty in some geographical regions and lower
sensitivity to risk by making dramatic changes in external environmental conditions (Bürkle &
Posselt, 2008; Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007; Shane, 1998). Expecting the superiority of the plural
form over the pure form, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1: Firms with plural structures and firms with singular structures have different levels of risk.
H2: Firms with plural structures and firms with singular structures perform at different levels.
Resource scarcity theory, agency theory and risk sharing theory are often used to explain
the reasons behind a hotel company’s franchising or management decisions and the possible
consequences of these distribution strategies. From the agency theory perspective, franchising is
a response to classic principal-agent problems. Agency theory explains the relationship between
principals and agents in business, which occurs when one party (i.e., the principal) hires another
party (i.e., the agent) to do business on the principal’s behalf. In such a relationship, agency
problems arise when the principal and agent have different interests, desires or goals. Within a
hotel firm, agency problems arise when a hotel firm and the employee managers of the firm’s
hotels have different interests or goals. Agency theory explains how franchising can reduce such
agency problems as moral hazard and adverse selection and the agency costs of controlling
managers’ activities (Lafontaine, 1992). The benefit of franchising occurs by offering to others
the option to own and operate a unit, instead of hiring employee managers to maintain the unit
(Diaz-Bernardo, 2012). Franchisees are owners of their businesses and generally share with
franchisors the goal of maximizing the value of their businesses. A hotel firm’s propensity to use
franchising can reduce the monitoring problems and costs that sometimes occur when hotels are
company-owned and managed by a manager hired by a firm.
From a resource scarcity perspective, franchising is primarily a means of accessing the
scarce capital and managerial resources needed to open a new unit. Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969)
have suggested that firm franchises alleviate scarce resources by making accessible managerial
expertise, local market knowledge and capital. Lack of capital and managerial resources is a
major obstacle to rapid expansion. Franchising allows franchisors to advance their growth and
market penetration quickly. Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) have suggested that elements of
resource scarcity theory and agency theory are important to explaining why firms decide to enter
into franchising.
Risk-sharing theory suggests that management and franchising arise from the need to
share risk or transfer part of a firm’s risk to another party (Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine &
Bhattacharyya, 1995). According to this theory, franchising and management help both firms and
owners of properties share the risks of business. Franchisees and owners of managed units
reduce their business failure rates by using well-established concepts, and firms lower the
business risk associated with fixed costs and the volatility of operating expenses at the unit level.
Both franchising and management rely on access to other parties’ capital. As such, franchising
and management models lower the cost of fixed investment capital for firms and accordingly
lessen business risk. In addition to fixed costs, firms are not responsible for most expenses
related to hotel operation, since their cash flow typically depends on sales-based fees. In this
sense, the risks associated with the volatility of operating expenses can be buffered by
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simultaneously employing franchising and management strategies, which can reduce variability
in firm performance. Linking risk-sharing theory to agency theory, Brickley and Dark (1987)
have found evidence that firms tend to avoid agency-related risks by franchising properties that
have high employee-monitoring costs. Using variance of sales and variance of cash flow, Martin
(1988) and Roh (2002) have examined whether franchisers rely on franchising to reduce risk and
concluded that higher proportions of franchised units are related to lower business risk.
Theoretically, from the agency, resource scarcity, risk sharing and plural form
perspectives, franchised and/or managed units are supposed to lower costs, improve growth and
reduce business risk, compared to wholly-owned units (Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007). The
empirical results of previous studies support the notion that franchised units are superior to
company-owned units when it comes to generating profit. Using a strategic group approach,
Combs et al. (2004) found that restaurant firms that franchised in response to agency-based
concerns outperformed firms that franchised in response to resource scarcity. Sorenson and
Sørensen (2001) found that the optimal mix of units for outperformance depends on different
degrees of geographic dispersion. Although differences in level of performance depended on the
extent of environmental heterogeneity encountered by the restaurant chains in their study, in
general, restaurant chains that combine franchising and company-ownership performed best
under all conditions. Hua and Dalbor (2013) also provided empirical evidence for the restaurant
industry where franchising is an effective mechanism to consistently outperform non-franchise
firms in the long-term. Some researchers like Bradach (1997) and Lewin-Solomons (2000)
suggest the a non-linear relationship between the efficiency of franchising and company
ownership. In hospitality research, Koh, Lee, and Boo (2009) and Hsu and Jang (2009) proposed
that the relationships are curvilinear or polynomial, considering both the benefits and drawbacks
of the plural form (Ehrmann & Spranger, 2007). They provided evidence of the non-linear
relationships between franchising and performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA),
return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. Hsu and Jang (2009) have found an inverted U-shaped
relationship that indicates the proportion of franchised units deemed optimal to maximize the
profitability and intangible value of restaurant firms.
Research on the plural business model tends to examine the efficiency of franchised and
company-owned units and does not consider such other forms of business as management,
licensing and joint venture. Management contracts, in particular, are very popular in the lodging
industry. Hence, hotel managers need guidelines on how to make key decisions when entering
into new markets or expanding their distribution. Management contracts lie between franchising
and company-ownership (Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001), and a balance of franchising,
management and ownership strategies is believed to be most beneficial to hotel firms, since each
of these approaches has distinctive benefits and drawbacks. Management contracts are similar to
franchise agreements, in that firms with management contracts provide such services as brand
development, reservation system management and fee collection over the terms of their contracts
and are not responsible for initial capital investments, working capital and operating expenses.
However, firms under management contracts provide most daily managerial, operational and
technical support, while firms under franchise agreements heavily rely on franchisees’ resources
and capabilities (Dev, Erramilli, & Agarwal, 2002). According to Dev et al. (2002), the presence
of unreproducible resources and capabilities and the availability of qualified local investment
partners make management more attractive than franchising. Another deficit in empirical
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research is the importance of risk when explaining the consequences of franchising, management
and ownership. While researchers have empirically found that risk is the primary cause of firms’
choices to franchise or pursue management contracts, the development of risk as a consequence
of the use of franchising and management strategies has been largely ignored by previous
studies. Based on our review of the literature and the need for further exploration of management
and risk, we hypothesize:
H3: The relationship between the proportion of franchised outlets and a firm’s risk is inversely
U-shaped.
H4: The relationship between the proportion of managed outlets and a firm’s risk is inversely Ushaped.
H5: The relationship between the proportion of franchised outlets and a firm’s performance is
inversely U-shaped.
H6: The relationship between the proportion of managed outlets and a firm’s performance is
inversely U-shaped.
Methodology
Sample and Data
This study investigates whether firms that do business through multiple forms (i.e., a mix
of franchising, management, and ownership) are less risky and perform better than firms with a
single form. It also examines the impacts of franchise proportion and management proportion
within the plural form. The sample consists of all hotel firms that have available data on 10Ks or
annual reports from 2002 to 2012. The sample includes a set of firms that meet the following
criteria: firms are publicly traded at any time from 2002 to 2012; they are classified as hotels
(except casino hotels) and motels by the North American Industry Code System (NAICS)
721110; and they have franchise, management, and ownership information available during the
study period. Fifty-nine hotels are initially listed. Then, we filter these 59 hotels through the
aforementioned criteria, which yields seven non-gaming hotels and 67 firm-year observations.
Due to data availability constraints and the resulting small sample size, the results must be
interpreted with caution. The accounting, market, and property data are collected from 10Ks,
Yahoo Finance, and the St Louis Federal Reserve. Sample is split based on the plurality of their
units. Specifically, the firms that are made up of a mixture of franchised, managed, and wholly
owned/operated units are in the plural form group and the firms that have only a single form of
units – either franchised, managed or wholly owned/operated units are in the single form group.
In the sample, franchising is the type of business form when a single form is used; no firm-year
observations where properties are 100% managed or 100% wholly-owned.
Independent Variables
Franchise, management, and ownership. Lodging firms operate primarily under franchise,
management, and/or ownership business forms. To measure the extent of the use of each form,
the proportion of units (i.e., properties) under each form is used. Specifically, a franchising
variable was measured by dividing the number of franchised units by the total number of units
within a firm’s system. A management variable was measured by dividing the number of
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managed units by the total number of units within a firm’s system. An ownership variable was
measured by dividing the number of wholly owned and operated units by the total number of
units. The franchise, management, and ownership variables indicate the relative focus of each
business form. These measures are chosen based on the measures used in previous franchising
research. Researchers have measured firms’ use of franchising by calculating the percent of
franchised units (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Hsu & Jang, 2009; Koh et al., 2009; Shane, 1998), the
ratio of franchised to company-owned outlets (Shane, 1996), the percent of sales from franchised
outlets (Michael, 1996), or dummy variables. Among these measures, the percent of franchised
units is known to have high validity, because their operational definitions are very closely linked
to their construct definition (Combs & Ketchen, 2003). Most hospitality researchers have used a
dummy variable or a percent of the franchised outlets. These studies do not consider the
management in their analyses, and usually examine differences between franchise and ownership.
To our knowledge, there is no study that empirically examines management, so we compute
management variables by using the same method of franchising calculation. We compute and use
the percent of franchised, managed, and owned units in this study.
Control Variables
Firm size. Firm size was included as a control variable, because it tends to influence a
firm’s performance and risk. Many researchers have considered firm size an important feature
that demonstrates a firm’s characteristics, and they believe it has a strong relationship with firm
performance or risk. It is known that as firm size increases, the level of risk decreases. Larger
firms are likely to a have greater variety of capabilities and these capabilities often help
operations to respond more effectively and efficiently to changes in a firm’s external and internal
environments. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) pointed out that large firms make advertising and
R&D more profitable, so they enjoy economies of scale, which in turn can help them to perform
better. Size is often considered a proxy for available resources and thus an indicator of a firm’s
ability to resist external pressure from the general environment (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Size in
this study is measured by the log of total assets, which is one of the common methods of
measuring firm size.
Leverage. This study included leverage as another control variable to account for the
impact of leveraging on a firm’s risk and performance. Leverage serves as a proxy for the
probability of default. Interest and principal payments are obligations that can cause financial
distress. Therefore, investors perceive highly leveraged firms as risky, because a highly
leveraged firm is more vulnerable to financial distress. Such firms have limited slack resources
and tend to be less able to exploit changes in their strategic position and less able to respond to
changes in external environments. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital-structure
irrelevance proposition assuming no taxes and no bankruptcy cost, a firm’s relative proportions
of debt and equity don’t matter for a firm’s value. However, in reality, the cost of equity and the
cost of debt are influenced by a firm’s dependency on debt financing due to shareholders’
perception of the riskiness of leveraged firms, bankruptcy costs, and tax savings from the interest
tax deduction. Ultimately, this perspective suggests that leverage influences the cost of capital
and ultimately changes the value of the firms. Leverage is measured in this study by dividing
long-term debt/total assets.

6

Market condition. This study also controls market condition because a firm’s risk and
performance is influenced by external environments, especially economic conditions. The
measure of general market conditions utilized is the market excess return, measured (Hua &
Upneja, 2007) by the return on Standard and Poor’s Composite Price Index minus the threemonth Treasury bill rate.
Dependent variables
Risk and performance. We attempt to examine whether a firm’s risk and performance are
influenced by the firm’s mix of business forms. Therefore, the dependent variables that we select
for this study are a firm’s overall risk and performance. A firm’s risk is measured by the standard
deviation of the firm’s monthly stock return. A firm’s performance is measured with profitability
variables (i.e., return on asset and cash flow per share) and hotel industry variables (i.e., RevPAR
and occupancy). Multiple performance measures are used in this study, because consistent
evidence across the different performance measures allow us to confirm the relationship and
different levels of impacts enable us to better capture the relationship. Return on assets (ROA),
as measured by dividing net income by total assets, explains how efficiently a firm is using its
assets to generate earning. Cash flow per share (CFPS) is measured by taking operating cash
flow, subtracting the preferred dividends, and dividing by the number of outstanding shares.
Some researchers believe cash flow is a better measure of a firm’s performance due to the fact
that measures using earnings can be more easily manipulated. We also include two hotel industry
performance measures: RevPAR and occupancy. These are measured by the ratio of a hotel’s
output to its input. Occupancy and RevPAR are very commonly used as representatives of
productivity measures in the lodging industry. Under the franchise form, a firm (franchisor)
collects franchising fees including an initial fee and continuous fees. Continuous fees such as a
royalty fee, a reservation fee, an advertising or marketing fee, and a frequent traveler fee are paid
periodically over the term of the agreement. Under the management form, firms generate
management fees from managed units. The fees include a base fee, which is a percentage of the
gross revenue of the managed units and an incentive fee, which is a percentage of operating
income. Firms that conduct business through wholly owned and operated units collect all the
revenue, but have fixed capital investments and operating costs at the unit level. The different
revenue sources and cost structure can create differences among the four performance measures
and a firm’s overall risk.
Data Analysis
This study employs independent samples t test to compare the risk and performance
measures between the plural form group and the single form group. Then, using only the data of
firms that do businesses through the plural form (i.e. the plural form group), we perform five sets
of hierarchical regression analyses to test hypotheses three, four, five, and six. These analyses
aim to examine the specific effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables while
controlling for a firm’s leverage, size, and market condition. By hierarchically adding higherorder terms into the analysis, we examine the R2 change at each step to see if the inclusion of the
higher‐order terms accounts for more variance. In the regression model, ownership % is
excluded, because it is highly correlated with the change in management (corr=.89, p <.001) %.
Its inclusion causes multicollinearity in the model, which implies the lodging firms’ tendency to
7

convert owned units into managed or franchised units or vice versa, rather than a tendency to
convert managed units into franchised units or vice versa. The quadratic functions for testing
curvilinear relationships are expressed below:
Risk = β0 + β1 Franchise %+ β2 (Franchise %)2+ β3 Management %+ β4 (Management %)2+
Controls . . . . . . . . . (1)
Performance = β0 + β1 Franchise %+ β2 (Franchise %)2 + β3 Management %+ β4
(Management %)2+ Controls . . . . . . . . . (2)
We hypothesized that β2 is negative in both equation (1) and (2), implying that the
franchise % has an inverted U-shaped relationship with a firm’s risk and performance. We also
hypothesized that β4 is negative, implying that the management % has an inverted U-shaped
relationship with a firm’s risk and performance. Linear terms are entered first, followed by a
model that includes both linear terms and quadratic terms.
Results
To test hypotheses one and two that the level of risk and performance differs between
firms with a plural structure and firms that focus on a single form, the sample is split into the
plural form group and the single form group, based on the plurality of property portfolios. The
results of the independent samples t test indicate that firms with a plurality of business forms
have significantly different levels of risk and performance, supporting hypotheses one and two
(Table 1). Firms with plural form are less risky and generate higher performance than firms with
a single form of business. The mean difference in risk is .0461. The mean differences in ROA,
CFPS, RevPAR, and Occupancy between the plural and single form are -.0279, -.3379, -45.6019,
and -7.9761, respectively. Our results show that lodging firms seem to experience the positive
impacts of the plurality of business form and this finding is consistent with previous research.
Additionally, the firms with a single business form focus on franchise rather than management or
ownership.
Table 1.
Comparison of Risk and Performance between a Plural Form and a Single Form

Franchise %
Management %
Ownership%
Risk
ROA

Plurality

Mean

Std. Deviation

Single
Plural
Single
Plural
Single
Plural
Single
Plural
Single
Plural

1.00
0.53
0.00
0.3
0.00
0.18
0.12
0.08
0.03
0.05

0.09
0.23
0
0.19
0.01
0.25
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.05

Mean
Difference

T

0.36

8.99***

-0.3

-10.11***

-0.18

-4.97***

0.05

2.02*

-0.03

-2.574***
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Single
Plural
Single
RevPAR
Plural
Single
Occupancy
Plural
*
**
***
p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.001
Cash flow per share

0.04
0.38
49.07
94.67
57.96
65.94

0.038
0.29
16.79
36.87
6.3
5.48

-..34

-7.40***

-45.6

-6.268***

-0.08

-5.142***

Table 2 presents the results of our tests on hypotheses three to six. The model for testing
whether the risk is related to franchise% (F%) and management % (M%) produces a statistically
significant result when using a linear relationship (R2=.53, F=4.71, p<.01). The coefficient of M%
in the model is not statistically significant whereas the coefficient of F% is. The prediction is not
statistically improved with the quadratic equation at the .05 level of significance, so hypotheses
three and four which predict curvilinear relationships are not supported.
With respect to a firm’s performance, most performance measures are related to F%
or/and M%. The models with the linear terms of F% and M% demonstrate that the variance in
ROA is significantly explained by franchised % and management % (R2=.66, p<.01) and that the
variance in REVPAR is significantly explained only by management %. However, the linear
terms of F% and M % do not explain the variance in CFPS and OCC. The models with both the
linear and the quadratic terms of F% and M% are proven to have incremental improvement in
their prediction of CFPS, REVPAR, and OCC, because the quadratic terms account for more
variances in CFPS, REVPAR, and OCC (∆R2=.26, .03, .16, ∆F=12.68, 5.20, 14.43, p<.01, 05, 01,
respectively) than linear terms do. The coefficients of squared F% are statistically significant at
the .05 level, but the regression coefficients of squared M% are not statistically significant at this
level.
As shown in Table 2, the franchise percentage has a negative linear relationship with a
firm’s overall risk, suggesting the franchise % in a firm’s system reduces the level of the firm’s
overall risk as it increases. However, the results of our analysis do not support the curvilinear
relationship that this study’s hypothesis three predicts. Moreover, the management percentage is
not related to a firm’s risk at all, controlling for franchise percentage, size, leverage, and market
condition. The findings suggest the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
proportion of franchised units and the lodging firm’s performance (i.e., CFPS, REVPAR, and
OCC), supporting hypothesis five. However, hypothesis six which states that the relationship
between the proportion of managed outlets and a firm’s performance is inversely U-shaped is not
supported. The relationship is linear. Management percentage positively affects ROA and
REVPAR, whereas CFPS and OCC are not related to management percentage. These
relationships are summarized by the graphs in Figure 1.
The control variables are either not statistically significant or only marginally significant.
LEVERAGE is not an influential factor on a firm’s performance and risk at a .05 level of
significance. A firm’s SIZE was positively related to the ROA, and MKT is positively related to
REVPAR and OCC. The control variables used in the study are commonly used control variables
for studying performance or risk, but our results demonstrate somewhat different relationships
from those found in previous literature. Our insignificant control variables might have resulted
9

from multicollinearity or small sample size. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) in the
regression models range from 1.088 to 8.748, so they are within the acceptable range (as a rule of
thumb, VIFs of 10 or higher indicate multicollinearity concerns). The sample size in this study is
small, because few lodging firms report specific information about business forms, especially
information about managed properties. Thus, low power due to the small sample size could have
led to our insignificant control variables.
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Table 2.
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis

Independent Variables
Constant
Franchise %
Management %

Risk
Overall risk
β
.088
-.048
-.22**
.51
-.02
-.18

(Franchise %) 2
(Management %)2
Firm’s leverage
Firm’s size
Market excess returns

ROA
β
.07
.31**
.21**

.21
-.21
.63**

-.57*
.37
.13
.01
-.02

.08
-.01
.05

R2
.53
.63
F
4.71**
4.46**
∆F
2.35*
∆R2
.10
*
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Dependent Variables
Performance
Cash flow per share
RevPar
β
β
-2.44
-3.96
2.58
1.26
-.71
19.07**
.49
10.17**
1.72
3.22
1.28**
.01
-14.89*
2.71

.42
-.72
-.07
.02**
-.02

-.09
.02**
-.03

.66
9.58**

.69
7.45**
1.38
.04

1.88
.42
.39

-1.31
.13
-.43

.51
.77
5.05**
10.74**
12.68***
.26

Occupancy
β
.53
.28
.07
2.29**
.13
.05

-12.81*
3.86
.49
.12
.30*

.47
.06
.38**

.91
.94
39.75**
45.76**
5.20**
.03

-3.00**
.64*
-.02
.01
.04

-.04
-.02
.07**

.77
.93
10.10**
24.25**
14.43***
.16
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Figure 1.
Relationships between Franchising Proportion, Management Proportion,
Risk, and Performance

RevPAR
RevPAR

Occupancy
Performance

Performance

CFPS

ROA

ROA
Franchise %

Risk

Risk

Management %

Franchise %

No relation

Management %

Discussion and Conclusion
Firms in the hotel industry have actively chosen between owning, franchising, or
managing hotel properties. Many researchers and practitioners have believed, the mix of
different business forms (i.e., plural form) is superior to the single form in terms of a firm’s risk
and performance. Firms with plurally organized chains are likely to be less risky and gain higher
performance than firms with purely franchised, purely managed, or purely owned/operated units.
This study provides evidence to support this belief, showing differences in risk and performance
between the two groups of firms. A firm can create a plurality of business forms through its
continuous efforts to select the best business form for the current situation that the firm faces.
Therefore, the plural form allows firms to outperform firms with a single form. According to the
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), hotel firms with more diversified businesses reduce their
business risks more than hotel firms with less diversified ones. Firms that create value through
multiple business forms could represent more diversification and are therefore less risky.
Diversification through the combination of business results through multiple forms lowers risk
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and smoothes out performance fluctuation. Thus, diversification reduces the probability a firm
will experience a very low performance.
This study further examines the potential curvilinear relationship between each form’s
proportion and the firm’s performance measures as well as between each form’s proportion and
the firm’s overall risk within the US lodging industry. The findings suggest that the proportion of
franchising has a negative linear relationship with a firm’s risk, no type of curvilinear
relationship with a firm’s risk. On the other hand, we find that the proportion of managed units in
a firm’s system has no significant relationship with a firm’s risk. Our findings support a risksharing approach to franchising that assumes that franchising helps both franchisor and
franchisee to share the risk of business. Franchisees reduce their business failure rates by using
well-established concepts and the firms (i.e., the franchisors) lower the business risk that is
associated with fixed costs and the volatility of operating expenses at a unit level. It would be
also easier to monitor and predict gross sales than profits and accordingly firms may plans better
for the future. Thus, the increase in franchise percentage in the portfolio of hotel properties can
lead to a decrease in a firm’s overall risk. Under the management form, hotel firms operate
properties under management agreements with property owners. Management contracts are
generally more complex than franchise agreements, and are often influenced by the property
owner’s voice and by the contract terms offered by competitors. A limited market and growing
competition among management firms to enter into new contracts give property owners stronger
bargaining power during the negotiation process. The recent proliferation of private equity firms
as hotel owners produces even more pressures on management firms to offer shorter initial terms
and more renewal options (Bader & Lababedi, 2007). Like franchising, management contracts
offer advantages to hotel firms by collecting the base fees according to the gross sales of units
and avoiding fixed capital investments. However, this unfavorable circumstance might adversely
affect firms that heavily rely on managed units and offset the positive impacts on a firm’s risk.
Similar to the results of previous studies, we confirm the existence of an inverted Ushaped relationship between the proportion of franchised units and lodging firm performance.
This study also suggests that the proportion of managed units has a positive linear relationship
with a firm’s performance. This study employs two profitability measures (i.e., ROA and cash
flow per share) and two hotel industry measures (i.e., RevPAR, and occupancy) as performance
indicators. Multiple performance measures are used mainly to see whether there is consistent
evidence across the different performance measures. Moreover, although most financial
performance measures are related to each other, they sometimes indicate different aspects of
performance and managers may place emphasis on different indicators of performance. The
negative coefficient of the squared term of franchise % suggests an inverted U-shaped
relationship with performance measures such as cash flow per share, RevPAR, and occupancy.
This means that an increase in franchise percentage improves a firm’s cash flow per share,
RevPAR, and occupancy while controlling for management proportion as well as a firm’s
specific factors (i.e., size and leverage) and market condition. This means that a hotel firm in its
plural form can generate an initial increase in its cash flow per share, RevPAR, and occupancy
by increasing its franchise percentage. However, after a certain level of franchise percentage, a
decrease in these performance variables is likely to occur, indicating that the drawbacks of
franchising might outweigh the benefits at higher levels of franchising. These findings are
consistent with Bradach (1997) and Lewin-Solomons (2000)’s arguments about a non-linear
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relationship between the efficiency of franchising and company ownership and empirical results
of Hsu and Jang (2009)’s study. As Hsu and Jang (2009) suggest, the inverted U shape indicates
the optimal proportion of franchised units. Under the franchise model, a firm is concerned about
franchisee’s free riding, where franchisees shirk on the brand name and do not provide the
quality of products and services the firm expects. As the number of franchised units increases, it
would be difficult and expensive for a firm to monitor the quality. Consequently, franchisees’
poor or irresponsible operations may lead to dilution and destruction of brand equity. Another
possible reason for the decrease after a certain point is an innovation challenge. Franchisees are
likely to resist to implement new ideas that are related to increases in costs are risks. As the
number of franchisees increase, it becomes relatively difficult for a firm to implement new ideas,
leading to conflicts between a franchisor and franchisees.
Our study further suggests that the optimal proportion can vary according to the firm’s
emphasis on different performance measures. Firms that focus on hotel industry-specific
performance such as RevPAR and occupancy have a lower level of optimal franchise proportion
than firms focusing on cash flow per share. A franchise percent that is too high in the mix of
business forms is likely to adversely influence some performance measures, because the firms
might find it difficult to control the quality of products and services across so many franchises.
Accordingly the franchised units may not experience the same levels of RevPAR and occupancy.
The hotel’s performance at the unit level will consequently lower the cash flow per share. In
addition, another profitability measure, ROA, tends to have a positive linear relationship with
franchise percentage, not a curvilinear relationship. These findings suggest that optimal franchise
proportion in the plural form depends on a firm’s interest in particular performance measures.
Our analysis does not show evidence that management proportion has an inverted Ushape relationship with all performance variables. Nevertheless, we do find that as management
percentage increases, ROA and RevPAR increase while controlling a firm’s size, leverage,
market condition, and management proportions. This means the higher the proportion of
management in a plural form, the better the ROA and RevPAR. The key difference between
management and franchising is who operate the business at the unit level. In general, managers
in managed units do what a firm asks them to do, so better management quality and expertise
could be obtained, compared to those in franchised units. On the other hand, franchisees usually
make operational decisions themselves to a great extent. As previously explained, too high
franchising proportion of property portfolio is likely to make drawbacks (i.e., brand equity
dilution and innovation challenge) of franchising outweigh its benefits. Under the management
model, a firm is unlikely to face this situation.
In summary, this study aims to help hotel owners, operators, and researchers to
understand better the impacts of franchising and management on a firm’s overall risk and various
performance variables. This study also demonstrates the superiority of the plural form over a
single form. Specifically, we prove the plural form to be better improving performance and
lowering risk than a single form. Furthermore, a plural form with a higher franchise percentage is
more likely to reduce a firm’s risk than other plural forms. In addition, a plural form with a
higher management percent can increase ROA or RevPAR, but it does not change a firm’s risk,
cash flow per share, or occupancy. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine how the
plural form and each form’s proportion influence risk. The results indicate that the optimal
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proportion of franchising varies according to a firm’s emphasis on a particular performance. The
findings of this study could be utilized by lodging firms to understand the effect of the
proportions of franchise, management, and ownership on the firms, before expanding their
number of units in the market.
Limitations and Further Study
Although this study attempts to reveal the proper levels of the three different business
forms in plurally organized hotel chains to improve performance and reduce risk, data
availability constraints force us to limit our analysis of the relationships. We have reviewed all
hotel firms that were publicly traded in the market, but many firms do not clearly report
information especially information about managed units. We strongly encourage conservative
use of our predictions due to the small sample size in this study. The data limitation might have
also led to the small number of studies associated with the plural form in the lodging industry.
Nevertheless, this topic should be an important research area, because franchising, management,
or other forms of business have become central in strategic decisions by hotel firms. Another
limitation is that this study could not consider some specific factors of hotel properties such as
market segments and locations mainly due to the sample size. For example, location, market
segment, or brands might influence the effect of the plural form on performance. For example,
Dev et al. (2002) found that economy or mid-priced hotel brands have franchised units more than
managed units, whereas luxury brands tend to have more managed units than franchised units to
control the quality of their products and services. Considering the portfolio of brands could
provide further insight into the plural form. Future research may also consider the relevance of
various measures of risks to capture more of the impact of the plural form on the risk.
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